analysis of texts · International Journal of Science and Research Archive · la publicación, 15 oct 2026 · gratis
Ninguna ley nigeriana nombra los videos falsos, y así lo evaluaron
Versión breve · la versión detallada sigue, unos 7 min
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- El estudio, de un vistazo
- Quiénes
- La ley de ciberdelitos de Nigeria y las normas de datos, pruebas y privacidad que la rodean
- Cuántos
- cuatro cuerpos legales evaluados: la Ley de Delitos Cibernéticos de 2015 reformada en 2024, la Ley de Protección de Datos de 2023, la Ley de Pruebas de 2011 reformada en 2023 y el derecho constitucional a la privacidad
- Dónde
- Nigeria
- Cuándo
- artículo de 2026; abarca hechos de 2023 a 2026
- Tipo de estudio
- análisis de lo que dicen las leyes y las sentencias
- Quién lo hizo
- Departamento de Tecnología de la Información, Nile University of Nigeria, Abuya
- El límite que importa
- No midió cuántos votantes fueron engañados ni si cambió un resultado electoral
Lo que la ley nigeriana sí alcanza y lo que deja fuera en un video falso de un candidato
El primero cae en el artículo 24; el segundo queda fuera del artículo y tendría que apoyarse en la difamación o en la ley electoral, que no fueron escritas para medios sintéticos
Ninguno de esos delitos castiga por sí mismo crear esa imagen sin consentimiento
La norma europea obliga a marcar la producción sintética y a revelar el contenido sintético; las nigerianas no tienen nada parecido a un deber de retirar videos falsos, y el video de Peter Obi siguió en línea
Antes de opinar sobre un video político, anote qué falta comprobar y espere; pida a su autoridad electoral que diga qué verificó y con qué método, y pregunte si una decisión que lo afecta se tomó por un dato automatizado o por una revisión humana.
1. Un artículo de 2026 revisó la ley de ciberdelitos de Nigeria junto con las reglas de datos personales, de pruebas y de privacidad. Concluyó que esas reglas cubren parte del problema. La ley de ciberdelitos de 2015, reformada en 2024, castiga el fraude y la suplantación con voces o caras falsas. También sanciona las imágenes sexuales de menores hechas con inteligencia artificial. La ley de ciberdelitos no define los medios sintéticos y no obliga a bajar un video falso. Además, ninguna regla castiga crear la imagen de un adulto sin su permiso; solo se cubren las imágenes de menores. Los autores citan un video manipulado de Peter Obi que siguió en línea. La revisión es doctrinal: no midió cuántos votantes fueron engañados ni si cambió un resultado.
2. El artículo no nombra ninguna página oficial donde un votante pueda verificar un video. Menciona que verificadores como Dubawa revisan a mano, y que ninguna herramienta de detección es del todo confiable.
3. La ley vigente es la de ciberdelitos, reformada en 2024. El artículo no cita ninguna resolución, auditoría ni sentencia electoral nigeriana sobre un video falso. Sus recomendaciones, como etiquetar lo sintético o crear un canal para víctimas, son propuestas, no reglas en vigor.
Qué significa para usted
Para usted, que va a votar, el artículo no deja una herramienta con la cual revisar un video sospechoso: los verificadores lo miran a mano y ninguna detección es del todo confiable. Ante un video de un candidato, pida ver la fuente original y desconfíe del audio que no tenga imagen. Lo que la ley nigeriana permite o deja de castigar se decidió en Nigeria y no dice nada sobre su país.
Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878
Quién pagó: El artículo no declara ninguna fuente de financiación y no reporta conflictos de interés; no dice nada sobre el papel de los financiadores ni sobre equipos o programas prestados.
Los hallazgos de otros estudios que aquí se mencionan los conocemos por este documento, que fue el que leímos; no abrimos cada uno de esos estudios.
Versión detalladaLos pasajes copiados del artículo, las ilustraciones y cada fuente con cuánto leímos de ella · 1445 palabras · unos 7 minLeerla →Cerrar
La regla y la evidencia: ninguna ley nigeriana nombra los videos falsos, y así lo evaluaron
### LO QUE DICE LA LEY
El estudio revisa la Ley de Delitos Cibernéticos de Nigeria de 2015, con su reforma de 2024, junto con la Ley de Protección de Datos de 2023, la Ley de Pruebas de 2011 reformada en 2023 y el derecho constitucional a la privacidad, y pregunta si ese conjunto basta para regular los videos y audios falsos hechos con inteligencia artificial1. La respuesta que da es que la cobertura existe, pero es parcial.
La ley no menciona los videos falsos, los medios sintéticos ni la inteligencia artificial; los alcanza, si acaso, con delitos redactados sin pensar en la tecnología1. La revisión recoge un estudio en el que se señala que ninguno de esos delitos castiga por sí mismo crear la imagen realista de un adulto identificable sin su consentimiento2.
Donde la ley sí muerde es en la difusión. La revisión recoge un estudio en el que se indica que, después de la reforma de 2024, un video falso de un candidato cae en el artículo 24 solo si quien lo envía sabe que es falso y lo manda para causar un quebranto del orden público o amenazar una vida3. La revisión recoge un estudio en el que se señala que los que buscan únicamente dañar una reputación o engañar a votantes sin ese propósito quedan fuera del artículo y tendrían que apoyarse en la difamación o en la ley electoral, que no fueron escritas para medios sintéticos4. La revisión recoge un estudio en el que se señala que no hay deber de retirar los videos falsos, y que el video de Peter Obi siguió en línea5.
### EL CASO AL QUE LE RESPONDE
Un video con la voz clonada del candidato presidencial colombiano Iván Cepeda circuló en redes antes de la segunda vuelta del 21 de junio, y le atribuía declaraciones que nunca hizo. Una verificación de AFP Factual del 17 de junio de 2026 encontró que un video sobre supuestas declaraciones misóginas usaba imágenes de un video de diciembre de 2025 en el que el candidato denunciaba una guerra sucia en su contra (visto en https://chequeado.com/investigaciones/clones-digitales-de-ivan-cepeda-difundieron-desinformaciones-antes-de-la-segunda-vuelta-presidencial-en-colombia/, 17 de junio de 2026).
La ley nigeriana no menciona los videos falsos, los medios sintéticos ni la inteligencia artificial, y es más débil justamente donde una persona es sintetizada sin su consentimiento. La revisión recoge un estudio en el que se relata que, en Nigeria, un clip que decía captar a Atiku Abubakar, Ifeanyi Okowa y Aminu Tambuwal hablando de cómo robar la elección circuló antes de los comicios de 2023, y que los verificadores hallaron rasgos poco naturales que indicaban voces generadas por inteligencia artificial6. La revisión recoge un estudio en el que se relata que, en mayo de 2025, un video de 49 minutos que decía mostrar a Peter Obi hablando con el líder de Burkina Faso superó las 136,000 vistas hasta finales de junio, y que Dubawa mostró después que se había montado audio manipulado sobre imágenes verdaderas7. La revisión recoge un estudio en el que se relata que, en mayo de 2026, la Presidencia advirtió que se estaban usando videos y audios falsos contra el Presidente antes de las elecciones de 20278.
El problema de fondo es de percepción. Antes fabricar estas grabaciones exigía pericia, tiempo y equipo; hoy la inteligencia artificial produce audio, imágenes y video que muestran con credibilidad a personas reales diciendo o haciendo lo que nunca dijeron ni hicieron9. La revisión recoge un estudio en el que se reporta que, en Nigeria, a la gente común le puede costar distinguir voces y videos sintéticos muy realistas de una grabación auténtica10. La revisión recoge un estudio en el que los verificadores dicen que la desinformación viaja más rápido que sus correcciones, y que los votantes notan una foto editada sencilla pero batallan con el audio y el video sintéticos11.
### LO QUE SE MIDIÓ
Ningún pasaje de este documento ofrece una medición del efecto sobre votantes, de cuánta gente fue engañada o de si algún resultado electoral cambió: es un análisis legal cualitativo de estatutos y sentencias, no un estudio de exposición ni de persuasión.
### LA RESPUESTA DE OTRA REGIÓN A LO MISMO
El Tribunal Superior Electoral de Brasil se reunió en sesión en febrero de 2024 para fijar reglas que guiaran las elecciones municipales de octubre de ese año12. Entre los temas debatidos, el principal fueron las deliberaciones sobre actos ilícitos en propaganda electoral en medios digitales con uso de inteligencia artificial, de las que salieron reglas para producir y distribuir propaganda política en audio, video o medios audiovisuales13. El tribunal apoyó sus decisiones en la legislación vigente de la Unión Europea y en las elecciones generales de Argentina de 202314.
La revisión recoge un estudio en el que se señala que el artículo 50 de la Ley de Inteligencia Artificial de la Unión Europea obliga a los proveedores a marcar la producción sintética en forma legible por máquina y a quienes la despliegan a revelar al público el contenido sintético15. El estudio describe dos modelos: la transparencia, que obliga a marcar y revelar el contenido sintético, y la prohibición dirigida, que castiga una conducta concreta, y concluye que lo importante es definir con precisión la conducta dañina en lugar de prohibir la tecnología.
### LA LECTURA DE LA CASA
Así lo leemos nosotros. Una imagen o una voz que se vuelve mercancía se mide por lo que atrae, no por lo que es; copiar o recrear deja de verse como daño y pasa a ser práctica normal del mercado. Esperaríamos que en Nigeria circulen sobre todo los videos falsos que rinden: figuras conocidas, hechos para atraer clics o dinero, y que la discusión pública se centre en quién es dueño de la imagen y no en el daño a la persona. Sabríamos que nos equivocamos si la mayoría de esos videos se hiciera por broma o por convicción política, y si los tribunales trataran la imagen de una persona como un derecho y no como una marca. Antes de reenviar un video llamativo de un político, pregúntese quién gana con que usted lo vea, y fíjese si la ley de su país protege la imagen de la persona o solo la marca registrada.
Lo curioso es que la gente también miente para taparse y para mostrarse como quisiera ser, y sostiene el personaje con tanta constancia que acaba confundiendo lo que es con lo que aparenta. Esperaríamos que muchos de estos videos no busquen un fraude concreto sino armar o deshacer una figura pública, y que sus autores los defiendan como sátira o juego; por eso una ley que exige probar la intención de engañar dejaría esos casos fuera. Sabríamos que nos equivocamos si casi todos los denunciados se hicieran para sacar dinero o con un fin electoral declarado, y si nadie alegara broma ni personaje. Cuando vea un video raro de un dirigente, pregunte si quien lo hizo busca engañar o solo provocar y hacerse notar; eso cambia qué se le puede exigir a la ley. Y desconfíe de su propia costumbre de creer lo que confirma la imagen que ya tenía del personaje.
### LO QUE NO SE SABE
No hay un solo remedio que una la conservación del material, la retirada, la investigación y la reparación; la víctima tiene que escoger entre varias puertas. Tampoco hay norma que faculte a los tribunales nigerianos a ordenar una pericia forense cuando se alega de manera creíble que hubo manipulación16.
La revisión recoge un estudio en el que se advierte que el peligro corre en los dos sentidos: una grabación auténtica puede ser desestimada como fabricación solo porque su manipulación es posible, y los videos falsos amenazan la confiabilidad de la prueba en juicio17.
El estudio propone enmendar la ley para definir los medios sintéticos y los videos falsos, y para castigar de forma acotada el video sexual no consentido, la suplantación maliciosa y el video falso electoral dentro de un plazo definido18. Son propuestas, no reglas vigentes; hoy nada de eso protege a un votante.
Aquí es donde al lector le toca hacer su parte. Antes de opinar sobre un video político, anote qué falta comprobar y espere; pida a su autoridad electoral que diga qué verificó y con qué método, y pregunte si una decisión que lo afecta se tomó por un dato automatizado o por una revisión humana.
La próxima vez que le llegue un video de un candidato, la pregunta útil no es si parece real, sino quién lo mandó, qué se gana con que usted lo crea y quién podría confirmarlo.
De dónde sale cada dato de contexto, y cuánto leímos de cada documento
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - el artículo del que trata esta nota — el artículo completo — el pasaje: "The Act makes no mention of deepfakes, synthetic media or artificial intelligence. It covers these activities, if at all, through technology-neutral crimes."
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - el artículo del que trata esta nota — el artículo completo — el pasaje: "None of them make it an offence per se to create a realistic image of an identifiable adult without consent."
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - el artículo del que trata esta nota — el artículo completo — el pasaje: "After the 2024 amendment, a deepfake of a candidate is caught by section 24 only if the sender knows it is false and sends it to cause a breakdown of law and order or threaten life."
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - el artículo del que trata esta nota — el artículo completo — el pasaje: "Those intended solely to damage a reputation or mislead voters without that purpose fall outside the section, and have to find support in defamation or the Electoral Act, which were not written for synthetic media"
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - el artículo del que trata esta nota — el artículo completo — el pasaje: "The NDPA and the Act contain nothing approaching the notice-and-removal duties of the TAKE IT DOWN Act for deepfakes, and the Obi video remained online"
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - el artículo del que trata esta nota — el artículo completo — el pasaje: "a clip purporting to capture Atiku Abubakar, Ifeanyi Okowa and Aminu Tambuwal discussing how to rig the vote was disseminated before the 2023 presidential election; fact-checkers uncovered unnatural features indicating that the voices were AI-generated"
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - el artículo del que trata esta nota — el artículo completo — el pasaje: "in May 2025, a 49-minute video purported to show Peter Obi addressing the leader of Burkina Faso had more than 136,000 views through to late June; Dubawa later revealed that manipulated audio had been layered over genuine footage"
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - el artículo del que trata esta nota — el artículo completo — el pasaje: "In May 2026, the Presidency warned that deepfake videos and manipulated audio were being used against the President before the 2027 elections"
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - el artículo del que trata esta nota — el artículo completo — el pasaje: "While fabricating such recordings ones required considerable skill, time and specialized equipment, generative AI now enables the production of synthetic audio, images and videos that can convincingly depict real people saying or doing things they never said or did."
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - el artículo del que trata esta nota — el artículo completo — el pasaje: "In Nigeria, experts have reported that ordinary citizens may struggle to distinguish hyperrealistic synthetic voices and videos from authentic recording"
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - el artículo del que trata esta nota — el artículo completo — el pasaje: "Fact-checkers say misinformation travels faster than their corrections, and that voters can spot simple photo edits but struggle with synthetic audio and video"
- Pessôa P, Bomfim I. (2026). Regulation of artificial intelligence in digital media to combat disinformation and defend the democratic state. Communication & Society. 10.15581/003.39.1.013 — solo el resumen - no se pudo obtener el texto completo — el pasaje: "In February 2024, the Superior Electoral Court of Brazil met in session to determine rules and regulations to guide the municipal elections of the country in October of 2024."
- Pessôa P, Bomfim I. (2026). Regulation of artificial intelligence in digital media to combat disinformation and defend the democratic state. Communication & Society. 10.15581/003.39.1.013 — solo el resumen - no se pudo obtener el texto completo — el pasaje: "Among the topics debated, the leading one was the deliberations on illicit acts in electoral advertisements in digital media, concerning the use of artificial intelligence, ensuing in regulations on the use of technology in developing, producing and distribution of political advertisements in digital forms such as: audio, video or audiovisual media."
- Pessôa P, Bomfim I. (2026). Regulation of artificial intelligence in digital media to combat disinformation and defend the democratic state. Communication & Society. 10.15581/003.39.1.013 — solo el resumen - no se pudo obtener el texto completo — el pasaje: "The article will discuss the deliberations of the Superior Electoral Court, which based its decisions on current legislation in the European Union and in the 2023 general elections in Argentina, regarding production aided by artificial intelligence for electoral campaigns."
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - el artículo del que trata esta nota — el artículo completo — el pasaje: "Article 50 of the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act requires providers to mark synthetic output in machine-readable form and deployers to disclose synthetic content to the public"
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - el artículo del que trata esta nota — el artículo completo — el pasaje: "We identified no provision empowering Nigerian courts to order forensic authentication where manipulation is credibly alleged."
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - el artículo del que trata esta nota — el artículo completo — el pasaje: "The reverse danger is also present: genuine recordings may be dismissed as fabrications merely because their manipulation is possible, and [1] warn that deepfakes threaten the reliability of evidence in court."
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - el artículo del que trata esta nota — el artículo completo — el pasaje: "amend the Cybercrimes Act to define “synthetic media” and “deepfake” and to target narrow offenses of non-consensual sexual deepfake, malicious synthetic impersonation, and deceptive election deepfake within a defined period"
Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878
Quién pagó: El artículo no declara ninguna fuente de financiación y no reporta conflictos de interés; no dice nada sobre el papel de los financiadores ni sobre equipos o programas prestados.
Los hallazgos de otros estudios que aquí se mencionan los conocemos por este documento, que fue el que leímos; no abrimos cada uno de esos estudios.
analysis of texts · International Journal of Science and Research Archive · the paper, 15 Oct 2026 · free
Nigeria's law has no deepfake offence, so a fake video of a candidate may go unpunished
Short version · the longer version follows, about 8 min
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- The study at a glance
- Who
- Nigeria's cybercrime law, read against data-protection and evidence law
- How many
- no count given; the authors call their assessment qualitative, not quantitative
- Where
- Nigeria
- When
- law as amended in 2024; cases from 2023 to 2026
- Kind of study
- analysis of what people did
- Who did it
- Department of Information Technology, Nile University of Nigeria, Abuja
- The limit that matters
- No measurement of how many people saw, believed or were moved by any deepfake
What the law catches, and what it leaves out
The first can be prosecuted under existing crimes; the second is not an offence in itself
The first is caught by section 24 after the 2024 amendment; the second falls outside it
The EU requires marking and disclosure; Nigeria's law has no such duty and no takedown duty for deepfakes
The question is no longer whether you can spot the fake, but who you can ask to prove the file is real — and whether anyone in the law is obliged to answer.
Nigerian researchers read the country's cybercrime law, updated in 2024, against the law on data protection and evidence. They found it covers a fake used to commit fraud, to impersonate someone, or to show a child, but not the act of making a real adult's likeness without consent. The article describes a study in which a video that appeared to show Peter Obi addressing a foreign leader had more than 136,000 views through to late June. The article describes a study in which fact-checkers later found that manipulated audio had been laid over real footage. The article describes a study in which the video stayed online when it was reported on.
The article names no way for a voter to check a video tonight. It says groups such as Dubawa train journalists to spot deepfakes by hand. It names no official page for checking a video.
The Cybercrimes Act 2015, as amended in 2024, is the rule in force. The article says it defines no synthetic media and sets no duty to take a deepfake down. Its recommendations, including labelling duties and a takedown procedure, are proposals only.
What this means for you
For a voter, the useful lesson is that a fake video can be made of a real person without breaking the law in Nigeria, as the researchers read it. Their reading is a judgement about the wording of a law, so watch for what an electoral body or a court actually does with a suspicious clip before drawing conclusions about your own country.
Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878
Who paid: The article states no funding source and reports no conflicts of interest; it says nothing about funders' role or any equipment or software lent.
The findings of other studies mentioned here are known to us through this document, which is the one we read; we did not open each of those studies.
The longer versionThe passages copied from the paper, the pictures, and every source with how much of it we read · 1590 words · about 8 minRead it →Close
The rule and the evidence: Nigeria's law has no deepfake offence, so a fake video of a candidate may go unpunished
### THE ACT
The law is the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015, amended in 2024, and it makes no mention of deepfakes, synthetic media or artificial intelligence1. Read with the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023, the Evidence Act 2011 as amended in 2023, and the constitutional right to privacy, it is the whole of Nigeria's answer to fabricated faces and cloned voices; the authors assess it across four stages of a deepfake's life and four tests, and the article describes a study in which Nigeria has no statute written for deepfakes or for artificial intelligence generally.
What is in force, for whom: the Cybercrimes Act binds everyone, and it reaches a deepfake only through crimes written for other things — computer-related forgery, computer-related fraud, identity theft and impersonation, child pornography, and cyberstalking1. The one provision that names synthetic imagery at all covers realistic images of a minor in sexually explicit conduct, and children only; nothing equivalent exists for adults. None of the offences makes it a crime in itself to create a realistic image of an identifiable adult without consent2.
Section 24, the most used provision, was narrowed by the 2024 amendment. After it, a deepfake of a candidate is caught only if the sender knows it is false and sends it to cause a breakdown of law and order or threaten life3. Those intended solely to damage a reputation or mislead voters without that purpose fall outside the section, and have to find support in defamation or the Electoral Act, which were not written for synthetic media4. The authors note the same section is vague enough to be used against journalists and critics, so the framework is both under- and over-inclusive.
Two duties a voter might expect are absent. The law contains nothing approaching a notice-and-removal duty for deepfakes, and the Obi video remained online5. And the authors identified no provision empowering Nigerian courts to order forensic authentication where manipulation is credibly alleged6. The recommendations — defining synthetic media, narrow offences for non-consensual sexual, malicious impersonation and deceptive election deepfakes, labelling duties, a victim pathway, forensic powers — are proposals, not rules in force7.
### THE CASE IT ANSWERS
Consider what the law is being asked to catch. Before Nigeria's 2023 presidential election, a clip circulated that purported to capture Atiku Abubakar, Ifeanyi Okowa and Aminu Tambuwal discussing how to rig the vote; fact-checkers found unnatural features indicating the voices were AI-generated8. In May 2025, a 49-minute video purported to show Peter Obi addressing the leader of Burkina Faso and had more than 136,000 views through to late June; Dubawa later revealed that manipulated audio had been layered over genuine footage9. In May 2026, the Presidency warned that deepfake videos and manipulated audio were being used against the President before the 2027 elections10. Nigeria has been the scene of a range of such abuse, from a cloned-voice clip before the 2023 elections to deepfakes of the President and of Peter Obi from 2024 to 202611. It would seem this is the kind of thing they mean.
The record of the Peter Obi video carries a detail worth pausing on: it stayed up. When the video was reported on, it remained online5. That is the gap the authors point to, and it is a gap in practice as much as in wording.
This week's open search found one further instance, and it is fully documented: videos with a cloned voice of the Colombian presidential candidate Iván Cepeda circulated on social networks before the 21 June presidential runoff, attributing to him statements he never made; an AFP Factual check of 17 June 2026 found that a video about supposed misogynistic remarks used images from a December 2025 video in which the candidate denounced a dirty campaign against him (seen at https://chequeado.com/investigaciones/clones-digitales-de-ivan-cepeda-difundieron-desinformaciones-antes-de-la-segunda-vuelta-presidencial-en-colombia/, 17 June 2026). It is a real instance with a name, a place, a date and a second source. It is not a Nigerian case, and the Nigerian law says nothing about it.
### WHAT WAS MEASURED
No passage gives a measurement of how many people were fooled, how many deepfakes circulated, or what any of this did to a vote. The assessment is a qualitative judgement by the authors, set out in a table of four stages against four criteria, and they say so plainly: it is not a quantitative one. The 136,000 views are a view count on one video, not a measure of belief or harm9.
What the record does report is other people's observation, not a study: experts have said ordinary citizens may struggle to distinguish hyperrealistic synthetic voices and videos from authentic recordings12, and fact-checkers say misinformation travels faster than their corrections, that voters can spot simple photo edits but struggle with synthetic audio and video13. Those are the accounts of the people doing the checking. They are not a measurement, in Nigeria or anywhere else.
### THE OTHER REGION'S ANSWER TO THE SAME THING
Two models appear in the record, and neither is African. Article 50 of the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act requires providers to mark synthetic output in machine-readable form and deployers to disclose synthetic content to the public14; the authors report its duties began to apply on 2 August 2026, with fines of up to €15 million or 3% of worldwide turnover, and those are European figures, not Nigerian enforcement results. The article describes a study in which the United States' TAKE IT DOWN Act criminalises publishing non-consensual intimate imagery, including AI-generated imagery, and since 19 May 2026 requires covered platforms to remove it within 48 hours of a valid request. On this side of the Atlantic, Brazil's Superior Electoral Court met in February 2024 to set rules for the October 2024 municipal elections, and the leading topic was the use of artificial intelligence in producing and distributing political advertising in audio, video and audiovisual form1516. The court based its decisions on legislation in the European Union and on Argentina's 2023 general election17.
### THE LIBRARY'S READING
Here is how we read it. A false story about a candidate has always done its work before the correction arrives: it leaves a residue of suspicion that the accused can never quite wash off, and the retraction travels slower and duller than the charge. What is new is not the rumour but the speed and the finish. A voice that sounds like the man himself, a face that moves the way the face moves, and the doubt lands in a voter's chest before any fact-checker has opened the file.
So watch for this in your own feed: the clip that hangs together too neatly, that confirms what your side already believed, that arrives without a date or an original. The polished version will feel more true than the clumsy one, and that feeling is the thing to distrust, not the person who sent it. You can check us wrong on this: if corrections in your community travel as fast and as vividly as the fakes, and change minds at the same rate, then the old story about rumour no longer holds and we should say so.
A public can learn to check a date, a source, an original file. What it cannot easily check alone is whether the file itself is real, and that is exactly the question a deepfake puts to a voter at the screen. This is where the region's own electoral history matters, and where it should make us careful rather than confident: a country that has contested a result before will read a correction from the electoral body through that memory, which is why the authority's published audit may matter more than its ban.
### WHAT IS NOT KNOWN
The record is silent on how many Nigerians saw any of these clips, believed them, or changed a vote because of them, and it is silent on whether the Obi video or the pre-2023 voice clip changed any result. It is also silent on detection accuracy: the authors name no measure, and rely on fact-checkers' own account that no tool is fully reliable. The article predates its own recommendations, so no enforcement outcome can be evaluated, and it does not assess the re-enacted Electoral Act 2026 in detail.
The law's own blind spot has a name in the record: none of the offences makes it a crime in itself to create a realistic image of an identifiable adult without consent2, and the authors identified no provision empowering Nigerian courts to order forensic authentication where manipulation is credibly alleged6. A rule with no enforcement behind it is not protection, and the authors say as much — statutory reform without forensic capacity will leave new offences hard to enforce. And there is a reverse danger they name: genuine recordings may be dismissed as fabrications merely because manipulation is possible18.
The one fully documented instance this week comes from Colombia, and we should not read it as if it were Nigeria's. Whether a cloned voice before a runoff in one country tells us anything about a cloned voice before a Nigerian election is a question about carrying over, not about what happened there.
You are standing at the screen with a clip that sounds exactly like the man. The question is no longer whether you can spot the fake, but who you can ask to prove the file is real — and whether anyone in the law is obliged to answer.
Where each piece of context comes from, and how much of it we read
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - the article this story is about — the whole article — the passage: "The Act makes no mention of deepfakes, synthetic media or artificial intelligence. It covers these activities, if at all, through technology-neutral crimes."
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - the article this story is about — the whole article — the passage: "None of them make it an offence per se to create a realistic image of an identifiable adult without consent."
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - the article this story is about — the whole article — the passage: "After the 2024 amendment, a deepfake of a candidate is caught by section 24 only if the sender knows it is false and sends it to cause a breakdown of law and order or threaten life."
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - the article this story is about — the whole article — the passage: "Those intended solely to damage a reputation or mislead voters without that purpose fall outside the section, and have to find support in defamation or the Electoral Act, which were not written for synthetic media"
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - the article this story is about — the whole article — the passage: "The NDPA and the Act contain nothing approaching the notice-and-removal duties of the TAKE IT DOWN Act for deepfakes, and the Obi video remained online"
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - the article this story is about — the whole article — the passage: "We identified no provision empowering Nigerian courts to order forensic authentication where manipulation is credibly alleged."
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - the article this story is about — the whole article — the passage: "amend the Cybercrimes Act to define “synthetic media” and “deepfake” and to target narrow offenses of non-consensual sexual deepfake, malicious synthetic impersonation, and deceptive election deepfake within a defined period"
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - the article this story is about — the whole article — the passage: "a clip purporting to capture Atiku Abubakar, Ifeanyi Okowa and Aminu Tambuwal discussing how to rig the vote was disseminated before the 2023 presidential election; fact-checkers uncovered unnatural features indicating that the voices were AI-generated"
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - the article this story is about — the whole article — the passage: "in May 2025, a 49-minute video purported to show Peter Obi addressing the leader of Burkina Faso had more than 136,000 views through to late June; Dubawa later revealed that manipulated audio had been layered over genuine footage"
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - the article this story is about — the whole article — the passage: "In May 2026, the Presidency warned that deepfake videos and manipulated audio were being used against the President before the 2027 elections"
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - the article this story is about — the whole article — the passage: "Nigeria has been the scene of a range of such abuse, from a cloned-voice clip preceding the 2023 elections to deepfakes of the President and of Peter Obi from 2024 to 2026."
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - the article this story is about — the whole article — the passage: "In Nigeria, experts have reported that ordinary citizens may struggle to distinguish hyperrealistic synthetic voices and videos from authentic recording"
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - the article this story is about — the whole article — the passage: "Fact-checkers say misinformation travels faster than their corrections, and that voters can spot simple photo edits but struggle with synthetic audio and video"
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - the article this story is about — the whole article — the passage: "Article 50 of the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act requires providers to mark synthetic output in machine-readable form and deployers to disclose synthetic content to the public"
- Pessôa P, Bomfim I. (2026). Regulation of artificial intelligence in digital media to combat disinformation and defend the democratic state. Communication & Society. 10.15581/003.39.1.013 — only the abstract - the full text could not be fetched — the passage: "In February 2024, the Superior Electoral Court of Brazil met in session to determine rules and regulations to guide the municipal elections of the country in October of 2024."
- Pessôa P, Bomfim I. (2026). Regulation of artificial intelligence in digital media to combat disinformation and defend the democratic state. Communication & Society. 10.15581/003.39.1.013 — only the abstract - the full text could not be fetched — the passage: "Among the topics debated, the leading one was the deliberations on illicit acts in electoral advertisements in digital media, concerning the use of artificial intelligence, ensuing in regulations on the use of technology in developing, producing and distribution of political advertisements in digital forms such as: audio, video or audiovisual media."
- Pessôa P, Bomfim I. (2026). Regulation of artificial intelligence in digital media to combat disinformation and defend the democratic state. Communication & Society. 10.15581/003.39.1.013 — only the abstract - the full text could not be fetched — the passage: "The article will discuss the deliberations of the Superior Electoral Court, which based its decisions on current legislation in the European Union and in the 2023 general elections in Argentina, regarding production aided by artificial intelligence for electoral campaigns."
- Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878 - the article this story is about — the whole article — the passage: "The reverse danger is also present: genuine recordings may be dismissed as fabrications merely because their manipulation is possible, and [1] warn that deepfakes threaten the reliability of evidence in court."
Kolapo, R., Yaye, S. O., Usman, S. et al. (2026). REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK. International Journal of Science and Research Archive. https://doi.org/10.30574/ijsra.2026.21.1.1878
Who paid: The article states no funding source and reports no conflicts of interest; it says nothing about funders' role or any equipment or software lent.
The findings of other studies mentioned here are known to us through this document, which is the one we read; we did not open each of those studies.